When Opposites Distract

So, I know it's been a while.

In the newest issue of Foreign Policy there's a piece by Susan B. Glasser profiling Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, and I think it offers more confirmation on what we already know: fundamentally those who have bought in to the post-Rwandan Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine--from Samantha Power and Susan Rice to Barack Obama and David Cameron--will continue to find themselves at odds with Russia because of a core, and historic, difference in worldview.

When we met, I asked Lavrov about why the Americans kept thinking they would change his position on Syria, coming back to him again and again with new proposals that he promptly rebuffed. After a few sentences of reflection, he pulled a small white piece of paper out of his pocket. It was a quote from Alexander Gorchakov that he had brought expressly to share with me. "Foreign intervention into the domestic matters is unacceptable," he read. "It is unacceptable to use force in international relations, especially by the countries who consider themselves leaders of civilization."

Whereas R2P empowers and even demands that the international community actively prevent man-made humanitarian tragedies like the genocide in Rwanda domestic non-interference, of the type espoused by security council members Russia and China, categorically reject this concept. The fear, at least abstractly, is that what starts as an intervention about humanitarian concerns in Benghazi can end up in Moscow or Beijing. Ironically, the US has refused to be bound by international laws and regulations from the Kyoto Protocols to the ICC, mostly based on fiercely independent principles that aren't all that dissimilar to Russia's unwillingness to open herself to a potential compromise or challenge by outsiders. However, that has not stopped the United States from using its power and influence to participate and lead the interventionist charge.

Of course, while Libya was a recent example of a situation which saw R2P in action, Syria has proven to be an even more complex manifestation of the circumstances which justify this "responsibility." While Glasser's piece, titled "Minister No," hints at a long history of Russia saying "No" to Western demands, particularly in matters as principled as foreign intervention, it also paints the picture of a foreign policy structured to be pragmatic as well. Indeed, Russia's abstention on the no-fly zone in Libya, which quickly became something else entirely, may have been somewhat of a pragmatic approach to the intricacies of the Arab Spring in 2011 rather than pure ideology.

What may have happened was that Russia, through turning a blind-eye towards intervention in Libya (a state that was significantly lower in importance to her than Syria) thought that she could create a circumstance where the West might be occupied in a conflict that would give Assad enough time to quell his rebellion. In effect, allow one intervention to occur to prevent a conversation about another much more important one. If this was the case, it was obviously a severe misjudgment. Instead, the result has been that the West having now had their cookie--Libya--continues to try and nibble at Russia's cake--Syria.

The business of gangstering

As Omar says, "All in the game yo, all in the game."

The brother of President Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karazi, was killed today by a member of his bodyguard.

By most accounts, Ahmed was a gangster, but a gangster that was the man behind the curtain in Kandahar. Here is a great Harper's piece that breaks down his recent attempt to be named governor of the province.

The man was clearly not a saint, and was likely heavily involved in the drug trade and other activities undermining efforts at nation building in Afghanistan. However, he was also one of the most powerful men in the region. His death is going to leave a power vacuum that may not be easy to fill.

While the Taliban claimed to have ordered the assassination, it's unclear what the real story is behind his death. It may turn out that this was an entirely unrelated event to the political agenda of the Talibs, it may be a "domestic" type dispute, a revenge killing, or something related to his "business" dealings.

But if the Wire has taught us anything, it's that when you play the game, sometimes you get got.

Update:

Foreign Policy delves into the mystery of who killed Ahmed and why.

The changed game

Risking vitriol, insult, and frustration, I'll wade back into the Middle East Peace Process once again. 

Michael Walzer offers the specter of a bleak future for peace if significant progress is not made in the coming months. And Netanyahu's speech before Congress does not raise any hopes that it might.

[If] the Palestinians are smart, as they are these days, they won’t walk across the lines, for that raises the specter of return, and the right of return doesn’t (yet) have sufficient international support. Come September, after the UN recognizes their state, they will march inside the 1967 lines, thousands of them—from Nablus, say, into the nearby settlements and army bases, asserting their own sovereignty and territorial integrity. And what will Israel do then? Many Israeli rightists would, almost certainly, prefer a new terrorist campaign, which would put the Palestinians once again in the wrong. That is certainly possible, but it is, suddenly, less likely than peaceful protest.

Faced with this doomsday scenario--and the detentions, shootings and violence that seems inevitable with Walzer's future is indeed dooming, and damning, for Israel--avoiding the issues of peace is an impossibility for Netanyahu and his government. If peace is not tackled straight on, Israel will become a self-created prison for itself--isolated and forced to justify not merely the daily injustices that we witness today, but rather wholesale terrors against thousands that will assuredly be played out in front of the international media. The worth of a UN vote will be in the global attention it gets. And that focus will not fade if masses of Palestinians march to claim their land and are turned away under a hail of gunfire.

What Netanyahu and his supporters don't grasp is that the game and its spectators have changed. Violence cannot be hidden from T.V., twitter, youtube, even if the prying eyes of journalists can be avoided. Events across the Middle East and North Africa have proven this. If the horrors of Syria, Yemen and Libya can be transmitted out of societies much more closed than Israel's, how will the world not be able to bear witness to what violence may come out following the UN vote? How will global leaders be able to justify continued support of Israel in that environment?

I'll repeat Walzer's question: What's your plan Bibi because the Palestinains have theirs?

A couple of thoughts on Obama's speech

Here are some thoughts I've had from Obama's speech:

1) Color me underwhelmed. Not too much has really changed with this speech. Yes, Bahrain made an appearance--and the Saudis will not be happy about that--but otherwise the rhetoric was, well, rhetorical and consistent with the messaging that's come out of the Administration so far.

2) Speaking of Saudi Arabia, guess who was conspicuously absent in the speech...

3) Frankly I had hoped to see something more significant than "The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states." We all know that, and while maybe this is the biggest forum for that language--I'm not even sure about that point--he needed to go one step further. A clear line in the sand that calls for the removal of existing settlements and the permanent halt to the building of future ones was needed. Mutually agreed upon land swaps is too vague and potentially impossible.

4) Attempting to disentangle Jerusalem from the issue of borders is disingenuous--it is a key component to border issues. East Jerusalem is home to 200,000 Jews/settlers and those borders should not be separate from larger discussions.

5) Obama clearly came out against any attempts by the Palestinians to garner UN recognition for a state, but is there anything in this speech that won't have them follow through on that threat?

5a) The speech offered the Palestinians very little. With language like: "the conflict between Israelis and Arabs has cast a shadow over the region. For Israelis, it has meant living with the fear that their children could get blown up on a bus or by rockets fired at their homes, as well as the pain of knowing that other children in the region are taught to hate them. For Palestinians, it has meant suffering the humiliation of occupation, and never living in a nation of their own," Obama sets the sides up as Israelis suffer all the violence, Palestinians are taught to hate. That's demonstratively false and ignores the fact that Palestinians have suffered 4x the casualties over the last 25 years.

6) Removing Egyptian debt will be helpful, but isn't that just playing around with the billions in aid already given? Increasing trade seems to be a bigger issue--and more sustainable for future development.

UPDATE:

Also what on earth does this mean: "The fact is, a growing number of Palestinians live west of the Jordan River. Technology will make it harder for Israel to defend itself. A region undergoing profound change will lead to populism in which millions of people – not just a few leaders – must believe peace is possible."

Balaclava Justice

There are disturbing reports coming out of Benghazi about extrajudicial killings occurring by armed gangs. I brought up the issues of revenge and what comes after Gaddafi a few days before Resolution 1973 was passed. It appears that some of the fears I expressed are coming true as members of Gaddafi's security apparatus are being targeted. Whether or not they are the only ones being targeted and who is doing the targeting remains unclear, but what is apparent is that there is a lack of the so-called "monopoly on the use of force" that is crucial in order for a society to function effectively. If there are unregulated, and unlawful, units operating outside of the law and acting out of their own grievances it will pose a considerable threat to Libya's future. This story needs to be followed and will be tell-tale of Libya's ability to function as a cohesive and lawful state moving forward.

Who's the Prince o' Persia?

Interesting stuff going on in Iran these days. There appears to be a bit of a power struggle going on between President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei that has gone from a political struggle centered, at least in part, over a disagreement on a cabinet appointment to the personal.

The public campaign to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and heighten the authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may have entered a new stage today. In depicting Ayatollah Khameni's status as that of an infallible Imam, Hojatoleslam Kazem Sadighi, leader of Tehran's Friday Prayers, even took a swipe at the president's wife. "One of the cabinet ministers told me, we believe that if his Excellency (Supreme Leader) decrees the divorce of the president's wife, the president's wife will become haram (religiously forbidden) for him and the president will no longer be able to touch her," Sadighi said in his sermon.

It has gotten to the point that Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, thought to be a potential successor, has been arrested over claims that he has been dabbling in the "black arts"--and implying that the President was himself involved.

This testy environment  has been simmering for a few weeks now, but the Supreme Leader's ultimatum to Ahmadinejad, leave my man in charge of the Intelligence Ministry or resign, is a far-cry from the election period of 2009 when Khamenei voice his support.

Let's see what happens, but do follow Scott Lucas over at EA WorldView he's been on top of things. Check out his analysis here.

Update:

Let me add that for those who perceive or understand our various world wide partners on this planet, and especially those in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, mostly through the way they interact with their neighbors, both near and far, that this is an example of just how complex countries are, no matter where they lie. As the last months have shown, there is a lot more to the various nations in this world than just their interaction with the United States. International domestic politics has had a resurgence on the global stage and in the global perspective that has been healthy and should serve to undermine anyone's conceptions that countries are singular things where only singular issues dominate above all else.

Was killing Osama worth it?

Some food for thought.

Over at Carl Prine's blog, Line of Departure, I've gotten into a little conversation with Carl about the value, need and price of killing Osama bin Laden and I am reposting and modifying what I wrote there, here. Essentially the question he is wondering is what the strategic value in killing Osama was, especially when you consider the lack of organizational hierarchy in today's al-Qaeda and the relative lack of importance that bin Laden now has for the organization and its continued operation. Tied in to that is the price tag for killing him.

There was definitely a point where killing Osama would have had the utmost strategic value and would have had the maximum effect on his organization, their ability to finance themselves and to recruit. Is May 2011 that time? Probably not. Should his capture or death still have been a central component to our efforts in the War on Terror, that's debatable. Likely the most useful thing, strategically speaking, that may come out of this is a demoralizing blow to AQ's supporters and the intel (computers, hard drives, etc.) gathered during the operation.

What I would argue is that the greatest value in his death was in domestic political capital for President Obama. In this case, the killing of bin Laden, it's hard to disentangle the strategic need from the political one, especially when the orders for the operation are coming from a political figure who made a political promise: to find and kill Osama. What I mean by that is that the aims of the war are defined by those who order it and in this case Obama's aims, and his ownership of the war in Afghanistan, were based on a desire to finish off AQ and kill bin Laden.

Yet the issue that still remains is price. It is an issue that has implications for strategic policy as well as for political policy--how much is too much to do something. In this situation the price--billions of dollars, risking dozens, if not hundreds, of lives, and potentially damaging our relations (ahem) with Pakistan--probably did not make sense for strategic purposes, if those purposes themselves were not killing bin Laden as an ends all to themselves. If killing Osama was the aim, than politically this was a clear win for Obama. And it appears it was.

But then again, Israel's search for Eichman and other Nazis was also not about achieving strategic advantages--it was about bringing to conclusion (justice?) events that had both damaged a nation's--in this case the Jewish nation--psyche and killed its people. Other than Obama's political capital gained from this, that might be the essence to this assassination.

I guess the question to ask is at what price is justice, or maybe revenge, justifiable. And how much are you willing to spend for it--both in time, blood and money?

In that same vein, Ezra Klein makes some very interesting, and disturbing, points on how bin Laden and co. succeeded in a game plan to make us pay in terms of blood, treasure, freedom and even values. There is a price on everything, it seems, and in some cases you only get the bill after you've paid and paid.

Post-Osama Afghanistan

I had planned to write a piece on the future of the US involvement in Afghanistan, but Osama bin Laden’s death adds a new twist to our commitments there that needs to be incorporated into any discussion. In effect his killing may raise the question of whether or not this event will be seen as marking the beginning of the end of our engagement in Afghanistan.

When we first invaded Afghanistan, our actions stemmed from attacks on US assets, particularly the devastation of September 11, which had been orchestrated by members of al-Qaeda living in the country. Our purpose was to flush them out, capture or kill them, and create an environment in Afghanistan that would no longer be conducive for groups like al-Qaeda to freely operate in and attack us from.

To accomplish these goals we invaded, orchestrated the overthrow of the existing political structure, and supported and financed the creation of a new authority—a secondary aim to our primary mission of removing al-Qaeda. The result was that a part of the country supported this move, while another part fiercely contested it, even as most attempted to continue with their daily lives uninvolved in a larger political struggle. Ten years later that general breakdown holds true.

During this past decade while we have attempted to develop tactics and strategy for defeating the Taliban—the main, if not decentralized, adversary to the Karzai-led and US-supported government—it is important to come back to our original goal in order to put our strategies and tactics in perspective. In that context it is important to remind ourselves that our main goal was, and still is, the removal of Afghanistan as a home for a global terrorist movement.

Yet along the way to achieving this goal we become embroiled in nation-building and fighting an insurgency, even as both of those outcomes were secondary to our primary concerns with al-Qaeda and should not necessarily be looked at as aims existing unto themselves. In fact, neither secondary element would exist if not for our central mission. And in many ways this main objective has already been accomplished. Al-Qaeda has moved operations away from Afghanistan to its franchises around the world, particularly in Yemen and Africa, it has a presence of less than 100 members remaining in Afghanistan according to the US military, and, if bin Laden’s death and the killing or capturing of other top associates over the years has shown, Pakistan and not Afghanistan has become the “safe-haven” for many of its important figures.

The problem is, our war in Afghanistan has crept well beyond the original impetus for our involvement and even our original mission—removing al-Qaeda. Instead the secondary goal—a Taliban-free and democratic Afghanistan— has taken the majority of our focus and has, in many ways, superseded our primary concern.

In attempting to deal with this additional objective, we have been forced to fight a counterinsurgency (COIN) war against the Taliban and its affiliates. At its most basic, COIN involves a governing authority's attemps to stop or control an insurgency that has challenged it. The goal of the insurgent is to undermine or wipe out that authority, and its power, in the area or population they are attempting to dominate. The counterinsurgent is attempting the opposite—to protect their influence and clout and eliminate or contain the insurgent. Simple. Right?

Unfortunately, that is rarely the case. Without going into depth over the diverse reasons as to why various insurgencies exists—in Afghanistan the Taliban’s loss of power is the fundamental component to their struggle—the key towards successfully fighting one is through maintaining, securing and expanding a government’s control over the contested domain it is facing an insurgency in. To successfully do that the government must have some sort of combination of the following: legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the population and/or the willingness and ability to annihilate their enemy and its support base.  Herein lies the problem of Afghanistan—the Afghan government and the US do not have the needed legitimacy nor do they have the willingness to totally destroy the Taliban and anyone who might support it considering the mass civilian casualties that will cause, even if the US might have that capability on paper.

That the US has hitched itself to an Afghan government that does not have widespread moral or political legitimacy is at the core of the problem with our engagement in Afghanistan and our stated goal of a democratic and Taliban-free country. If we can remove the possibility of a scorched-earth type campaign against the Afghan insurgency from the playbook, there remains only one real option for succeeding in this operation— a more legitimate authority than the current one. But that too does not seem like a real possibility. Unfortunately, there is not a readily available alternative to the Karzai government that does not involve the Taliban.

Given these fundamental issues, it's important to reevaluate our situation and go back to the original impetus for our involvement in Afghanistan—the denial of a home for al-Qaeda—as a means of questioning whether or not our primary concerns have been accomplished to an acceptable degree and if our secondary aims are both important enough to outweigh the costs they accrue and feasible enough to be accomplished.

In light of Osama’s death, it seems likely that pressure will mount to draw down our troops in Afghanistan. The Taliban was never a global threat to the US, nor the reason we invaded, and killing bin Laden, as symbolic as it might be, is evidence of the waning of al-Qaeda—even as events in the Arab Spring have further demonstrated.

Yes, there will be concerns over what will happen in Afghanistan if we withdraw and whether or not a contested state will allow elements like al-Qaeda to again find refuge. But instead of conjecturing about a potentially worse “what if” scenario in the future, we should focus on the already bad present—both in terms of costs in blood and treasure and our inability to defeat the Taliban—in evaluating the benefits of our continued commitment. Within that appraisal it seems logical that our decision-making should be based not on unknowns but on the realities we face—including the reality that al-Qaeda, without Osama bin Laden as its ideological head, is no longer the organization it once was.

Osama Bin Laden dead

Nearly 10 years after 9/11, Osama is dead. Killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, about two hours north east of Islamabad. Apparently Special Forces/CIA team killed him in a firefight. More to come.

And Saleh might not be gone...

Al Jazeera is reporting that a GCC deal for Saleh to cede power seems to be teetering after Salah refused to sign the agreement.

The man is a bait-and-switch, balancing-act professional and this is his highest stakes game yet. Wait and see.